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Frege s Problem for Demonstratives
Lets begin with Frege's problem for demonstratives: Kaplan's idea is that we solve FPD in the same way as we solve Frege's Problem in general, or at least for descriptions; we distinguish the sense of a from the sense of ~. But what are the senses of demonstratives? Surely 'dthat' means the same on both occurrences -has the same character. The difference is that demonstratives are incomplete and must be completed by demonstrations. As Kaplan stipulates it:
We can associate with each demonstration a character which represents the 'meaning' or manner of presentation of the demonstration. Demonstratives are incomplete expressions which must be completed by a demonstration (type). (ibid, 527) What, for Kaplan, is the character of a complete demonstrative? Here d is a demonstrative, 3 is an associated demonstration, and a demonstration is "typically, though not invariably, a (visual) presentation of a local object discriminated by a pointing." (ibid, 490) When one considers the completing demonstrations, then the identity statement can be informative:
For example, it might be informative to you for me to tell you that (I would, of course, have to speak very slowly) The two demonstrations -call the first 'Phos' and the second 'Hes' -which accompanied the two occurrences of the demonstrative expression 'that' have the same demon stratum but distinct manners of presentation. It is this difference between the sense of Hes and the sense of Phos that accounts, the Fregean claims, for the informativeness of the assertion. (ibid, 514-515) And in general: the content of 'that[a]' and 'dthat [~] ' are the same whenever a = ~. Thus the difference in cognitive significance cannot be attributed to content. (ibid, 530) The content of each utterance would be: (P-PH) «Venus, Venus>, = >
The cognitive significance is to be attributed to character:
E.(pistemological) Principle 1. Object of thought (Thoughts) =
